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PRAGMATISM AND PARITY IN APPOINTMENTS
Yxta cMaya (Murray*
Since the demise of Judge Robert Bork1 at the hands of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, a number of books from both ends of the political
spectrum have been written about the judicial selection process and
appointments in general. The Clinton Administration has been involved
in numerous contentious nominations and has achieved some important
successes, inspiring even more contributions to the debate over the
proper way to conduct the nomination and confirmation processes.
There has never been an easy consensus on the Executive's and the
Legislature's boundaries in this area; the appointment process was born
in conflict. The records of the Constitutional Convention do not expose
an original intent mandating that either the Senate or the President act
in any particular way in their respective appointment roles.2 Neverthe-
less, scholars' careful investigations into the Convention reveal that the
Framers initially intended to vest sole authority over appointments in
Congress.3 This decision arose from the fears of Benjamin Franklin and
others that granting the appointment power to the Executive would
result in a monarchy.4 Alexander Hamilton, supporting a strong execu-
tive, helped construct a compromise giving the President the nomination
power and the Senate the confirmation powers. This compromise,
embodied in Article II, Section II of the Constitution, was not easily
attained and was approved only after being defeated twice.5 Despite
these difficulties in allocating the nomination power to the President,
Hamilton believed that the compromise ultimately left the Senate with
* Yxta Maya Murray (J.D. 1993, Stanford Law School) is Associate Professor of Law
at Loyola Law School and served as Clerk to the Honorable Ferdinand F. Fernandez,
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
1. Robert Bork was nominated by President Ronald Reagan to the Supreme Court in
1987. His nomination was rejected by the Senate. See infra text accompanying notes
21, 29, and 30.
2. See Paul A. Freund, Appointment ofJustices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV.
L. Rnv. 1146, 1147 (1988) (remarking that very little was said on the Senate's and
the President's roles in appointments).
3. Freund, supra note 2, at 1147.
4. JOSEPH P. HARMS, THE ADvicE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 18-25 (1953).
5. See HA.ms, supra note 4, at 18-25 (detailing the Framers' debate over allowing the
Senate to have the authority over both nomination and confirmation of appointees
or dividing it between the Executive and Legislative branches).
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very little power.' This resolution was later codified in Article II, Section
II, which provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States.7
It is an ingenious solution that has the ability to guard against favoritism
and imperialism, which might arise if appointments were wholly in the
hands of the Executive, or copious disintegration, which could happen
if we left appointments to the many-handed behemoth of the Senate.
The system the Founders handed down leaves room for some healthy
debate and interaction between the two strongest branches. It also fosters
a balance of input and dissention into the appointment decision. Al-
though we might believe we are now in the midst of a modern appoint-
ments crisis, historically, the Senate's refusal to confirm a President's top
pick has been sporadic and politically minded.
Although this review will primarily focus on other types of ap-
pointment battles, the Senate's practice of dismissing nominees has been
most notable in the Supreme Court selection context. The practice
began with George Washington's nomination of John Rutledge, which
the Senate scuttled because of Rutledge's attack on the Jay Treaty.'
Some senators felt that Rutledge had displayed an extremist position that
conflicted with their vision of an even-keeled Court.' Rutledge's views
also alienated powerful members of the Federalist party, such as Oliver
Ellsworth, who led the opposition to the nomination. 0
Reflections of this scene have been replayed in various forms
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the nineteenth
century, the Senate rejected one-fourth of all Supreme Court nomi-
6. Hamilton wrote in The Federalist, "Every advantage to be expected from the power
of appointment... would, in substance, be derived from the power of nomination
.... There can... be no difference between nominating and appointing." HARIus,
supra note 4, at 18 (quoting THE FEDERALI S No. 76 (Edward Gaylord Bourne, ed.,
Tudor Publishing Co., 1937)).
7. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, d. 2.
8. Rutledge's defeat has been thoroughly discussed by prominent legal scholars. See
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THis HONORABLE COURT 79-80 (1985) (detailing
the 14-10 vote against Rutledge after his appointment by Washington).
9. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 79.
10. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 79.
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nees." The Senate rejected Andrew Jackson's first nominee, Roger
Taney, because of its negative response to Taney's removal, pursuant to
Jackson's order, of all government deposits from the National Bank. 2
Ulysses S. Grant nominated seven individuals to the Supreme Court but
saw only three confirmed, even though the Senate majority belonged to
Grant's own party. 3 Woodrow Wilson's nomination of Justice Brandeis
was also highly contested by the Senate for various reasons, including
Brandeis's political ideology, religion, and class.'4
Some Senators also opposed Herbert Hoover's nomination of
Justice Charles Evans Hughes because of their disagreement with his
economic views. They assumed that since Hughes had worked for large
corporations, he was committed to his clients' philosophies. 5 The attack
on Hughes served a symbolic purpose, signifying that Senators were
ready and willing to examine a nominee's ideology.16 The symbolism
quickly turned into reality with John J. Parker, whose nomination by
Hoover was rejected after the American Federation of Labor and the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People began a
sustained opposition, based on impressions of Parker's anti-labor stance
11. ETHAN BRONNER, BATT.E FOR JUSTICE 112 (1989).
12. BRONNER, supra note 11, at 112-13.
13. BRONNER, supra note 11, at 113.
14. The Senate's opposition to Brandeis is one of the lowest moments in this history.
Brandeis, an intelligent and dedicated Justice, was opposed by the Senate because his
opponents "regarded him as a dangerous radical and a crusader and hence unfit to
sit on the Supreme Court, which they regarded as a bulwark of conservatism." HAR-
as, supra note 4, at 113.
Senators also opposed Brandeis because of his religion and his class. "The fact
that he was a Jew and was an outsider who had become one of the outstanding
members of the Boston bar doubtless was a factor in his opposition by the Boston
group. HARsuS, supra note 4, at 113. The Senators, however, stated different reasons
for their opposition. They accused him of being untrustworthy, lacking a judicial
temperament, and being guilty of unprofessional conduct. HARRIs, supra note 4, at
113. Brandeis was absolved of all accusations, however, and the picture that emerged
indicated that he had extremely high ethical standards. HAIs, supra note 4, at 113.
See also A. L. TODD, JUsTIcE ON TRAL THE CASE OP Louis D. BRANDEIS (1964).
15. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 125.
16. HAMus, supra note 4, at 127:
The opponents did not hope to defeat the appointment of Hughes, but
rather to serve notice that they would scrutinize all appointments to major
policy positions and would stand ready to fight the nomination of conser-
vatives. The case is significant because emphasis was placed, not on the
ability and qualifications of the nominee, which were conceded, but rather
on his economic and political philosophy.
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and his disagreement with African-American suffrage. 17 President Rich-
ard Nixon's nomination of Clement Haynesworth failed after the Senate
Judiciary Committee discovered what it considered "evidence of the
nominee's patent insensitivity to some financial and conflict of interest
improprieties.""8 Haynesworth was further criticized for taking anti-civil
rights positions.'9 The Senate continued to disappoint Nixon when it
rejected the nomination of Harrold Carswell after reports surfaced of a
racist speech that the nominee had delivered."
According to one current school of thought, however, these exam-
ples of Senate dissension are minor compared to Judge Robert Bork's
fate and its grievous legacy. Judge Bork, a graduate of the esteemed
University of Chicago Law School, professor at Yale University Law
School, and prolific legal scholar, was at the center of an egregious
example of politicking in the judicial selection process.2' Some com-
mentators contend that the Senate's rejection of Judge Bork created a
bad precedent that Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton and the
Senate of the 1990s latched onto and expanded on with the incidents
involving Justice Clarence Thomas,22 Zoe Baird,3 Judge Kimba Wood,24
17. "When Parker was defeated, the Christian Science Monitor labeled it 'the first
national demonstration of the Negro's power since Reconstruction days.'" BRONNER,
supra note 11, at 115. See aho HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTcES AND PESIDENTs 42-3
(1974).
18. ABRAHAM, supra note 17, at 15.
19. BRONNER, supra note 11, at 116.
20. BRONNER, supra note 11, at 117.
21. BRONNER, supra note 11, at 122-23. See also ROBERT Bovic, THE TEmMPTNG OF
AMERICA (1990); PATRIcic B. McGui AN & DAwN M. WY-IucH, NINTH JusTicE:
THE FIGHT FOR BORKC (1990). For a similar but slightly different perspective, see
Bruce A. Ackerman, Transjbrmative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1164 (1988)
(finding that the Bork battle constituted a battle over a method of changing the
Constitution that eschewed the traditional role of amendments).
22. Clarence Thomas was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1991. See The Thomas
Confirmation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1991, at A12. See also Yxta Maya Murray, The
Cultural Implications offudicial Selection, 79 CoRNEL L Rav. 374 (1994).
23. Zoe Baird was nominated by President Bill Clinton for the position of Attorney
General in 1993. Her nomination was withdrawn. See generaly Paul M. Barrett &
David Rogers, Senate SupportforZoe Baird Is Precarious, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1993,
at A3. See also R. W. Apple, Case of Double Jeopardy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1993, at
Al.
24. Judge Kimba Wood was also nominated by President Bill Clinton for the position
of Attorney General in 1993. Her nomination was withdrawn. See Michael K. Frisby
& Cathy Trost, Judge imba Wood's Forced Withdrawal Leads Many to See a Double
Standard for Appointees, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1993, at A14; Richard L. Berke, Judge
Withdrawsfrom Clinton List for Justice Post, N.Y. TMEs, Feb. 6, 1993, at Al.
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and Lani Guinier,25 victims of a supposedly overly political appointment
scheme.
Stephen L. Carter, a professor at Yale Law School, joined the fray,
writing a book aimed at "cleaning up" the confirmation process. Profes-
sor Carter's The Confirmation Mess6 has two major foci. First, he exam-
ines the appointment process's eschewal of "decency," evidenced by the
abundance of mudslinging that can erupt during the Senate hearings.
Second, he writes about judicial independence, which he believes is
compromised by judicial nominees' subjection to Senate interrogations
designed to unearth their "judicial philosophy."2 7
This review uses Carter's two foci as a springboard for analyzing the
Article II, Section II appointment process. First, Carter's discussion of
indecency in modern appointments may be a valuable theoretical insight
into the process instead of a mere sociological observation. "Indecency"
in appointments, or what is known as "borking" in Carter parlance, may
also be a symptom of race and gender bias in the administration of the
Article II, Section II power. To ameliorate the effects of this bias, I
suggest the incorporation of pragmatism (a thread of philosophical and
legal thought) and parity concepts into the existing appointments
theories that have been advanced by scholars such as Carter, Laurence
Tribe, and Judge Bork.
Second, I critique Carter's prediction that a "politicized" judicial
selection process-one in which Senators ask candidates questions about
their ideologies-will hamper judicial independence. After looking at the
safeguards in the Constitution and the history of ideological exami-
nations in judicial selection, I conclude that judicial independence is not
threatened by these investigations. Instead, I posit that the harmful
instances of politicking in appointments often center on race and gender
politics, which lead to the prejudicial treatment of nonmajority candi-
dates. I return to the discussion of pragmatism and parity, and using
these concepts as guidelines, I attempt to develop tools for constructing
a better appointment process.
25. Lani Guinier was nominated by President Bill Clinton to head the Justice Depart-
ments Civil Rights Division in 1993. Her nomination was withdrawn. See Neil A.
Lewis, Aides Say Clinton Will Drop Nominee for Post on Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,
1993, at Al.
26. STPHEN L CArtER, THE CONFIRmATON MEss: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL Ai-
sonmTsmrms PRocEss (1994).
27. CarrnR, supra note 26, passim.
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I. CARTER'S ATTACK ON "INDECENCY"
Carter articulates the basic moral proposition that histrionic per-
sonal attacks on nominees are needless and unfair.28 To illustrate his
argument, Carter points to Senator Edward Kennedy's startling speech,
given on the day that Judge Bork was nominated by President Reagan,
which depicted a harrowing vision of "Robert Bork's America."29 It was
an ugly stab that painted Bork to be a resurrectionist of deadly "back-
alley" abortions and American apartheid."0 More recent examples of this
type of appointment posturing are Senator Robert Dole's and Senator
Alan Simpson's attacks on Lani Guinier, in which they announced that
Guinier is hostile to the fundamental precepts of democracy, is an
advocate of quotas, and is a "reverse" racist.
3 1
This venom is not new in the appointment game. As Carter points
out, Justice Thurgood Marshall was the subject of racist maneuvering in
his Senate hearings when Senator Strom Thurmond gave him a pop quiz
on constitutional minutiae.32 Another example was recounted by Joseph
P. Harris in his seminal book The Advice and Consent of the Senate, in
which he details accusations against Justice Louis Brandeis that were
motivated by anti-Semitism. 33
Still, Carter is correct when he argues that the ugliness seems more
intense today, and is facilitated by a wealth of alliterative or lascivious
digs: we have been fed images of Lani Guinier as the "Quota Queen, '34
Kimba Wood as the Playboy Bunny,3 5 Roberta Achtenberg as that
"damn lesbian,"36 and, of course, Justice Thomas as the tormenter of
28. CARR, supra note 26, passim.
29. See Kirk Victor, Drawing Lightning, 37 NAT. JouRNAL 2254, 2255 (1987).
30. In full, Senator Kennedy posited that "Robert Bork's America is a land in which
women would be forced into back-alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated
lunch counters, rogue police could break down citizens' doors in midnight raids,
schoolchildren could not be taught about evolution, writers and artists would be
censored at the whim of the government and the doors of the federal courts would
be shut on the fingers of millions of citizens." Victor, supra note 29, at 2255.
31. See Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Faces Battle over a Civil Rights Nominee, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 1993, at B9.
32. CARTER, supra note 26, at 75-76.
33. See HAus, supra note 4.
34. See Clint Bolick, Clinton'r Quota Queens, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1993, at A12.
35. See Berke, supra note 24, at Al, AT.
36. Roberta Achtenberg was appointed assistant secretary for fair housing at the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development in 1993. See Al Kamen, Helns on
Nominee: "She's a Damn Lesbian", WMH. PosT, May 7, 1993, at A21.
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Anita Hill and avid consumer of pornography 7 Once the critic con-
cludes that the rhetoric swirling around nominees is getting too nasty,
what is the next step? Professor Carter laments the current ethos of
"borking"-a pithy derivative nickname for smearing a candidate-but
his essay's focus on decency does not harness any theoretical insights
into where Article II, Section II has come from and what its future is.
Instead, the passages in The Confirmation Mess on decency and borking
recommend public persuasion more than constitutional exegesis.
Carter attempts to woo us away from "leaving blood on the floor"
and tries to encourage us to think about public service as a calling, not
as a reward for good behavior.3" To this end, he suggests that we grade
nominees using a continuum of flaws, some of which may be "curable,"
such as unprofessional, illegal, and immoral conduct,39 and others that
are usually not curable, such as a loss of public respect or a lack of
qualifications."0 For example, Zoe Baird was guilty of illegal conduct,
suffered a loss of public respect, and was rejected by President Clinton; 1
on the other hand, Justice Thomas was allegedly guilty of immoral and
unprofessional conduct but was saved by President Bush.' 2 Carter also
analyzes various reparative procedural possibilities, such as having the
nominee testify far in advance of other witnesses, forbidding interest
groups from testifying, precluding the nominee from testifying, exclud-
ing television cameras from the hearings, closing the hearings, and not
having hearings at al.13 He also suggests a constitutional amendment
that would impose a supermajority voting threshold on the Senate. 4 In
the end, he concludes that implementing most of these proposals would
be useless. He indicates that other options, such as implementing term
limits for Justices and creating judicial elections, may be somewhat more
fruitful. He finds that the "problem" with appointments, however, lies
in a societal, and thus, Senatorial, propensity for mudslinging and overly
politicizing the process.45
37. See Wiflliam Boot, The Clarence Thomas Hearings, 30 COLUM. JOURNAuSM REv. 25
(1992).
38. CARaR, supra note 26, at 206.
39. CAmErR, supra note 26, at 169-77.
40. CATER, supra note 26, at 161-71.
41. CAtra, supra note 26, at 26, 161-71.
42. CARa, supra note 26, at 178.
43. CAtr ER, supra note 26, at 191-95.
44. CARTER, supra note 26, at 196.
45. See CAxrR, supra note 26, at 196-202, 204.
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Carter's categories of nominees' flaws are interesting and have the
advantage of neatly categorizing the recent appointment disasters that we
have witnessed; his recital of various "modest proposals" also jars us into
reassessing the procedural status quo. Ultimately, he rejects concrete
reparations and instead tries to fix the public ethos. However, as legal
scholars, we might hope that we can do more with Carter's observations
to improve the appointment process than make optimistic stabs at
changing the irascible and media-driven mutability of public opinion.
One important step is to categorize the different aspects of the
appointment process in order to distinguish its social and political
elements from those elements that relate more directly to the law and
the Constitution. This requires us to acknowledge the distinction
between political action groups and members of the Senate, as Carter
does not do fully enough. There has been a consistent rise in the in-
volvement of public interest groups in the appointment process, 46 a
phenomenon that has probably influenced the vivid Senate reactions to
various candidates.4 7 Carter focuses on public interest groups and public
opinion in general when he analyzes the various appointment battles.48
However, public opinion-a "national mood"-cannot be regulated.
Instead, the citizenry's approach to nominees is subject to the forces that
exist in the marketplace of ideas, and therein may lie the power and the
function of Carter's book. Yet for the legal scholar, an even more
interesting approach may exist in the examination of the Senators who
participate in appointments, since they are the players who trigger the
history and power of Article II, Section II.
Appointment theory, mostly concerning judicial appointments, has
already been disseminated by legal scholars, including Carter. Laurence
Tribe wrote God Save This Honorable Court," Judge Bork published The
Tempting of America0 after his defeat, and the Harvard Law Review
issued a 1988 symposium on judicial appointments with contributions
46. See William G. Ross, Participation by the Public in the Federal Judicial Selection
Process, 43 V~AD. L. REv. 1 (1990).
47. CmarEr, supra note 26, at 98.
48. CARTER. supra note 26, at 98; see also CaTER, supra note 26, at 13 (discussing the
"mood of the nation"); CARTER, supra note 26, at 204 (positing that "the true
solution to the Supreme Court confirmation mess lies in our ability to develop a
public rhetoric about the Constitution that does not treat the Court as though the
results it reaches are all that matters").
49. TRIBE, supra note 8.
50. Boam, supra note 21.
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from Professor Carter as well as Professors Bruce Ackerman and Henry
Paul Monaghan.51 Carter's dissertation on borking can expand existing
theories on appointments beyond the confines of the judiciary if we
examine it in light of jurisprudential principles-that is, if we see how
Carter's cogent descriptions apply the legal theory. First, in Part A, I
examine how borking, or indecency, in recent appointment battles has
often been the product of race, gender, or sexual orientation bias. Next,
in Part B, I discuss the concepts of parity and pragmatism. Finally, in
Part C, I apply these concepts to the appointment process and examine
how they may explain and aid the process as it now exists.
A. Dissecting Recent Appointment Battles
Recent appointment conflicts involving Lani Guinier, Kimba
Wood, Zoe Baird, and Roberta Achtenberg can be analyzed using race
and gender as a lens, implementing the tools constructed by critical race
and feminist theorists.52 When we analyze these episodes by looking at
comments, responses, and communications, we can see that as applied
to these women, the appointment process was not a neutral device
gleaned from the Constitution, but was rather a process informed and
shaped by perceptions of race and gender.
Lani Guinier's appointment battle was disturbing because of the
virulence with which her scholarly articles on repairing racial voting
disadvantages were attacked, the ease with which she was labeled a lover
of quotas-tagged by the Wall Street Journal with the handy appellation
"Quota Queen" 5 5and the blatancy with which she was charged by
Senator Allen Simpson as being a reverse racist.5 4 Guinier attributes the
vehemence of this opposition to majority America's own racism,55 and
51. ESSAYS ON THE Su PREM Cousrr Appowmrr PROcEss, 101 HAzv. L. REv. 1146
(1988).
52. I have already propounded ideas about race and gender meaning in the judicial selec-
tion process and have dissected the Clarence Thomas hearings. See Murray, supra
note 22.
53. Bolick, supra note 34, at A12.
54. See Lewis, supra note 31, at B9.
55. Guinier notes,
My nomination became an unfortunate metaphor for the state of race
relations in America. My nomination suggested that as a country, we are
in a state of denial about issues of race and racism. The censorship imposed
against me points to a denial of serious public debate or discussion about
racial fairness and justice in a true democracy. For many politicians and
1995]
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indeed, the mischaracterization of her work on race and voting seems to
verify this conclusion.
When withdrawing Guinier's nomination, President Clinton
appeared to be responding to or agreeing with the interpretation that
Guinier's suggested methods for fixing voting channels that are broken
by racism were extreme, race-obsessed routes to racial equality that
threatened the pristine notions of democracy, neutrality, and egalitarian-
ism which we consider to be the foundations of our political system. 56
However, when Guinier's most contested methods of repair-cumulative
voting and supermajority rules-are analyzed, nothing emerges as par-
ticularly race-conscious, except for her reputed expectation that these
methods could have the effect of a "black veto" in certain circumstanc-
es.57 Still, it is unclear whether cumulative voting or supermajority rules
would necessarily have a particular propensity for fostering black vetoes,
since these devices, which Guinier suggests implementing only in the
face of egregious examples of racist blockage of minority votes,58 do not
dole out extra votes to citizens based on their racial heritage. 59 Instead,
they give greater power to the votes of any particular group regardless of
its racial composition.60
policymakers, the remedy for racism is simply to stop talking about race.
Sentences, words, even phrases separated by paragraphs in my law review
articles were served up to demonstrate that I was violating the rules. Because
I talked openly about existing racial divisions, I was branded "race ob-
sessed." Because I explored innovative .ways to remedy racism, I was
branded "antidemocratic." It did not matter that I had suggested race-
neutral election rules, such as cumulative voting, as an alternative to remedy
racial discrimination. It did not matter that I never advocated quotas. I
became the Quota Queen.
LAsi GurNmR, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJOR=T 19 (1994).
.56. See Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Abandons His Nominee for Rights Post Amid Opposition,
N.Y. Ti.ms, June 4, 1993, at Al.
57. See Ciarraa, supra note 26 at 41 n.*.
58. Guinier states,
I discuss supermajority rules as a judicial remedy only in cases where the
court finds proof of consistent and deeply engrained polarization....
[S]ome apparently fear that remedies for extreme voting abuses, remedies
like cumulative voting or the Mobile supermajority [after the supermajority
voting scheme approved by the Reagan and Bush administrations in
Mobile, Alabama], constirute 'quotas'-racial preferences to ensure minori-
ty rule.
GUNIER, supra note 55, at 17.
59. See GumnmR, supra note 55, at 19 (arguing that these measures are race neutral).
60. As Carter notes,
[fln one of her articles she suggests the replacement of at-large elections
for say, a county board of commissions (in which the majority gets all of
[Vol. 3:11
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One could argue that Bork's work was similarly mischaracterized,
and thus conclude that there was nothing racially compelling about
Guinier's early defeat. And indeed, there may be a parallel between the
way that Senator Kennedy accused Bork of being a racist and Senator
Simpson's characterization of Guinier. Yet the virulence that met
Guinier's accounts of racism in the voting process, and the seeming
myopia that characterized the interpretations of her law review articles,
signalled that part of the ruckus was about Guinier's open revelation
that racism still exists in this country. The readiness of certain Senators
to levy charges of reverse racism, while it is easily argued that Guinier's
theories are devoid of such racism, reveals an antagonism toward creative
and hopefully effective racial reparation on the part of the Article II,
Section II players and thus within the appointment process itself.
Similarly, the nomination of Zoe Baird and the near nomination of
Judge Kimba Wood for the position of Attorney General were disturb-
ing because these women's demise seemed inextricably linked to their
gender. Their elevations to that position were thwarted by their child
care problems: they had hired undocumented workers to baby sit for
their children and had defaulted on Social Security taxes,6 1 something
that had never stymied the successes of the (male) Attorney General
nominees who preceded them. Indeed, presumptions about motherhood
and women's roles in child care characterized the Senate hearings. For
example, Senator Orrin Hatch put a significant emphasis on Zoe Baird's
status as a mother. While he was discussing "equal opportunity for
individuals," Hatch abruptly began "commend[ing]" Baird for being
"willing to serve in the government."62 He said:
[T]here are a lot of people who just don't want to go through
the pain of the extra effort, because anybody who works in this
position as Attorney General knows that it isn't a nine-to-five
its candidates through, every time) with a cumulative voting system, in
which each voter gets as many votes as there are slots up for election. It is
easily demonstrated that minority voters will have greatly enhanced
opportunities to have their interests supported. This enhancement is not
a special gift to voters who are people of color: cumulative voting could
enhance the strength of anybody who represents a substantial but unrep-
resented constituency, from the Christian Coalition to the Green Party.
CARTER, supra note 26, at 39.
61. Barrett & Rogers, supra note 23, at A3. See also Apple, supra note 23, at Al.
62. Nomination of Zoe E. Baird as Attorney GeneraL" Hearing Befbre the Senate Judiciary
Committee, FED. NEws SERV., Jan. 19, 1993 [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Sen.
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)).
1995]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
job. It is a very, very difficult job. You are the mother of a
three-year-old child.6 3
Hatch's reference to Baird's "three-year-old child" and his reminder that
being an Attorney General is not a "nine-to-five job" seems fatuous, and
it strains the mind to imagine a similar discussion taking place between
the Senator and former Attorney General Barr.c6
In the end, being mothers did not help Baird and Judge Wood at
all. Instead, expectations that women are responsible for primary child
care65 and the readiness to dig into women's personal lives focused the
inquiry on Baird's and Wood's child care arrangements, which became
the linchpins of their failures.66 Rebellions against Baird's high pay and
class, due to her lucrative private sector position, also secured her
dismissal.67 But rich men have been nominated to high government
63. Hearing, supra note 62.
64. Hatch's exposition on motherhood and career dedication seems in line with Professor
Deborah Rhode's observation that "women 'can't make it' by conventional standards,
or are less committed to doing so." Deborah Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988
DuKE L.J. 1207, 1222 (1988).
65. Zillah Eisenstein notes,
The model of woman as exclusively wife and mother was preferred to the
model of woman as family member and wage earner. Thus day care is
something needed by wage-earning mothers, not wage-earning fathers.
Care of the children and the responsibilities of the home remain in large
part women's concerns.
ZILLA EIsmTEI, THE FEmMA BoDY AND THE LAW 130 (1988). Juliet Schor
posits,
To some extent, women have been able to substitute commercial services
for their own labor, using their newly earned paychecks to pay the
bill .... For both two-earner families and single mothers, the reduction in
women's time at home has led to a painful cutback in 'household services.'
Children are left in the care of others or even by themselves.... Unless
husbands are willing and able to pick up the slack, these changes are
virtually inevitable: employed women just do not have the time. Their
work-loads have already climbed above virtually all other groups.
JuurT B. ScHoR, THE OVERWORKED AMzulUCA 37 (1991) (footnote omitted).
66. Professor Mary Frances Berry wrote in the New York limes that Baird's nomination
"ran into difficulty because women still accept principal responsibility for child care.
How children are cared for seems natural to ask of a woman and not a man." Mary
F. Berry, The Father's Hour, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 10, 1993, at A23. See also Anthony
Lewis, If It Were Mr. Baird, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 25, 1993, at A17; Catherine S.
Manegold, Women Are Frustrated by Failed Nominations, N.Y. TME.S, Feb. 7, 1993,
at A22.
67. "Mr. Clinton finally realized he had to drop Ms. Baird only after a public outcry
against the easy law-breaking of someone so wealthy." The Lesson ofZoe Baird, N.Y.
TIMs, Jan. 23, 1993, at A20.
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positions before, and their opportunities were not stifled because of
public anger about their wealth and ability to obtain paid nannies."'
This analysis of Baird's nomination may be rebutted by the fact
that Baird broke social security and immigration laws, a flaw that
indicated that she may be particularly unsuited to a position in which
she would be responsible for the enforcement of the very laws she
violated. However, the strength of the motherhood and child care
themes, and their use to undermine powerful women, was also evident
in Judge Wood's experience with the appointment process. Judge Wood
was refused a nomination by the President, after a very public name
floating, even though she was not guilty of breaking any laws.69 It is also
worth noting that the Clinton Administration forged a policy of letting
nominees "cure" their previous wrongs by paying taxes and penalties,70
just in time to accommodate new male nominees such as Judge Stephen
Breyer and others.71
Judge Wood's treatment was even more obviously informed by
gender bias than Baird's, since the fact that Baird did break the law gave
plausibility to her episode. Despite the fact that Wood was not a law-
breaker, she was dismissed because of bad "appearances" resulting from
her hiring of an illegal alien (Wood was not breaking any laws at the
time of that particular hiring)72 and also from the revelation that she had
spent five days training to be a croupier at the Playboy Club in 1966
while she was at the London School of Economics.73 The New York
Times reported that White House officials "feared that that might
become the source of jokes" and that they "backed down" from the
Wood nomination after Senator Joseph Biden and others expressed
disapproval. 74 The White House was not only concerned about finding
instances of illegality, but also focused on anything that could raise any
appearance of impropriety, telling reporters that it, wanted "squeaky
clean" candidates. 75 One can only marvel that Judge Wood was rejected
because of a sullied reputation, while her nominating President had
68. See Lewis, supra note 66, at A17; Manegold, supra note 66, at A22.
69. See Frisby & Trost, supra note 24, at A14.
70. See CaaRE, supra note 26, at 28, n.*.
71. Mary Deibel, Clinton Court Pick Is Senate Favorite, S.E ExAM., May 15, 1994, at
Al.
72. Berke, supra note 24, at Al, A8.
73. Berke, supra note 24, at Al, A8.
74. Berke, supra note 24, at Al, A8.
75. Berke, supra note 24, at A8.
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admitted inchoately to infidelity and drug use,76 a Supreme Court
Justice had been confirmed after a convincing accusation of pornography
consumption and sexual harassment,77 and some commentators appeared
to believe that male government officials would not be reproached for
their attendance at the very establishment at which Judge Wood had
worked two decades before.78
Roberta Achtenberg's nomination, the only successful one in this
group, is one of the most obvious examples of prejudice. Achtenberg,
President Clinton's nominee for a supervisory position in the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, was called a "damn lesbian"
by Senator Jesse Helms, who proceeded to detail his exposure to, and
perceptions of, Achtenberg's openly gay lifestyle.7' Making Achtenberg's
sexual orientation an issue at her hearings was inappropriate because it
was motivated purely by bias toward a specific group. It was additionally
inappropriate because her sexual orientation was not relevant to the task
she was being called on to perform.
B. Introducing Pragmatism and Parity into
Theories about Appointments
Carter bemoans the presence of borking in appointments because it
is nasty. He notes how members of the Senate (and the public) were not
very nice to Bork during his hearings,80 and how Guinier was cruelly
76. See John Hanchette, A Look at Clinton's Problems, Gannett News Serv., Apr. 27,
1992, available in LEIS, News Library, Cumws File; Charles Krauthammer, The
Press Confronts Its Power, WASH. PoSy, Jan. 31, 1992, at A19.
77. See Boot, supra note 37; Murray, supra note 22.
78. Law Professor Mary Jo Ester, for example, queried "I'd like to know how many of
the men at the White House have never stepped foot in a Playboy Club." Frisby &
Trost, supra note 24, at A14. See generally Anthony Lewis, It's Gender, Stupid, N.Y.
TiMs, Feb. 8, 1993, at A17 ("[Let us now question every male nominee for a top
legal job about whether he was ever in a Playboy Club, or saw a pornographic
movie."); Anna Quindlen, Justice Is Blind, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 7, 1993, at A16
("Maybe it is better that she not work with people who further justified their
decision to cut her loose by adding their cheap-shot concerns that she had once
spent five days training as a Playboy bunny.., a lifetime ago, around the time the
young Bill Clinton was smoking dope at Oxford.").
79. Kamen, supra note 36, at A21. See also Ernie Freda, Gay Debate Fails to Derail
Achtenberg, ATLANrA J., May 25, 1993, at A8; Clifford Krauss, Housing Nominee Is
Attacked, N.Y. TimEs, May 21, 1993, at A12.
80. CARTER, supra note 26, at 126-27. Indeed, aside from Kennedy's speech, one
member of the Senate tried, unsuccessfully, to imply that Bork was a money-grub-
bing pseudo-intellectual. It was then revealed that Bork had taken high-paying legal
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labeled the "Quota Queen.""1 His method of reparation is, as stated
above, to influence public opinion, develop various categories of nomi-
nee flaws, and make suggestions aimed at changing the procedure of the
hearings and voting thresholds. However, Carter's suggestions and
methods are unsatisfactory because they do not address the nagging
evidence of bias that even he acknowledges at certain times.82 If the
borking in these battles is examined in light of some of the theoretical
tools that have been developed by legal scholars, then we may place
these disturbing incidents within the parameters of constitutional exege-
sis.
Two theories will aid our critical investigation of Article II, Section
II and its recent applications. The first is pragmatism, a branch of philo-
sophical thought that has been embraced by some in the legal academy.
Pragmatism in legal scholarship depends on a non-foundationalist world
view.13 It is an approach that eschews a monolithic, overarching theory
of legal interpretation. Instead, it depends on experience, contextuality,
dialogue, and a sense of community 4 to solve problems in an incremen-
tal 5 way that promotes "human flourishing.""6 Pragmatism can be seen
as an alternative to "foundational," generalized theories about the law,
positions to pay for the high medical bills that stemmed from his wife's battle with
cancer. BRONNER, supra note 11, at 263. In addition, many needless jibes were made
about Bork's personal appearance. See PAUL SIMON, ADVICE & CONSENT. CLARENCE
THOMAS, ROBERT BoRx AND THE INTRIGUING HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
NOMINATION BATrLEs 64 (1992). See also CARTER, supra note 26, at 128.
81. Indeed, in Carter's introduction to Lani Guinier's THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJoRITY,
he posits that "Quota Queen" was a sexist and racist dig: "Perhaps a white woman
would have been awarded the same crown, but it is easy to harbor doubts. The term
quota queen resonates mellifluously with welfare queen, a phrase never, in my experi-
ence, applied to recipients of public assistance who are white." GUINIER, supra note
55, at xix.
82. GUrINER, supra note 55, at xix. See also CARTER, supra note 26, at 139 ("mhe glee
with which too many Thomas opponents (particularly white ones) greeted the
revelation of Hill's charges was not merely. dismaying-it was actually quite fright-
ening.").
83. See Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MrNN. L R.
1331, 1376-77 (1988).
84. See Farber, supra note 83, at 1337. See also Farber, supra, at 1337-46, (citing JOHN
DEwEY, THE PuBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927); JOHN DEwEY, ExPERIENCE AND
NATURE 410 (2d ed. 1929); and Wixui JAMEs, PRAGMATISM 104 (1975)).
85. See Farber, supra note 83, at 1343.
86. See Robin L. West, Liberalism Rediscovered- A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal
Vision, 46 U. Prrr. L. Ray. 673, 693-701 (1985). See also Farber, supra note 83, at
1347.
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such as Robert Bork's "original understanding" foundation for legal
exegesis,s' orJohn Hart Ely's representation-reinforcing theory ofjudicial
review."8 Instead of applying one principle to all dilemmas, pragmatism
embraces a whole host of analytical tools to reach just solutions.
In addition, pragmatism may be considered an alternative to
conceptually consistent strivings for "ideal justice." 9 Pragmatism, an
approach that aspires in part to "piecemeal, temporary solutions,"90 is a
replacement for grand, sweeping theory, which, although it makes stabs
at the "best world,"91 cannot reach this goal on account of existing
societal inequities such as racism, sexism, and classism. This phenome-
non has been deemed the "double bind,"92 and can arise when we try to
apply grand theory to social justice problems. One example of this
dilemma is the "difference" model of gender equity,93 which has the
advantage of recognizing any genetically inherent or socially carved
distinctions between the sexes, but also has the disadvantage of reinforc-
ing women's status as "other."9 ' Pragmatism attempts to forge a more
87. See Boax, supra note 21, at 161, 167.
88. See JOHN HART ELY, DmoccRAcY AND DIsTRuST (1980).
89. See Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699,
1700 (1990).
90. Radin, supra note 89, at 1701.
91. Radin, supra note 89, at 1701.
92. Radin states:
To generalize a bit, it seems that there are two ways to think about
justice. One is to think about justice in an ideal world, the best world
that we can now conceive. The other is to think about nonideal justice:
given where we now find ourselves, what is the better decision? In
making this decision, we think about what action can bring us closer to
ideal justie .... In making our decisions of nonideal justice, we must
also realize that these decisions will help reconstitute our ideals.... The
double bind, then, is a problem involving nonideal justice, and I think
its only solution can be pragmatic. There is no general solution; there
are only piecemeal, temporary solutions.
Radin, supra note 89, at 1700-01.
93. See generally CAROL GiuAwN, IN A DIFFeRENT Voica (1982) (describing gender-
based differences in moral decision making). The difference model strives for gender
equity through emphasizing the differences between the sexes.
94. If, for example, we emphasize the difference of women, then they are necessarily dif-
ferent from the male model. The alternative to the difference model for gender
equity is the "sameness" model, which attempts to achieve gender parity by accord-
ing both sexes exactly the same treatment. One problem with the sameness theory is
that male dominance has made women different from men. See CATHARINE A.
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productive route than the foundational approach by using all of the
tools-smart ideas and philosophies, experience, community consensus,
minority input, and the immediate context-to develop the tailored and
just process necessary to solve a particular problem. 9"
The second factor to consider in the appointment context as it is
described in Carter's discussion of borking is parity, the concept of
equality that fuels not only legal scholarship but also much of political
and social discourse. In this review, the attempt to introduce parity
concepts into appointment theory will focus on scholarship that is
devoted to eradicating race and gender discrimination. The goal of
undermining these types of prejudice is well documented in the forms
of feminist legal theory, critical legal studies, and critical race theory.
These schools of thought are primarily concerned with critiquing the
rule of law from new perspectives, and with developing ingenious devices
such as the sameness/difference dichotomy, the "indeterminacy" cri-
tique,96 and the use of narrative97 to introduce broader concepts of social
justice into the legal realm. Parity, as noted by Professor Margaret Jane
Radin," is closely linked to pragmatism, since pragmatism is one meth-
od of making a functional, productive application of these devices to the
real, hegemonic world.
Some argue that this can be a difficult and even wayward approach
to interpreting the rule of law. Although theoretically, and even practi-
cally, pragmatism and its relationship to parity can produce a happy
jurisprudential exegesis and resolution of social and legal ills by using a
wide array of concepts, some scholars have worried that parity-pragma-
tism can also collapse into the purely "political," in the opportunistic,
MACKI NON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-34 (1987) (discussing the dominance-
created conundrum of the sameness/difference debate).
95. See Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HI v. L. Rav. 1849, 1915 (1987)
("[We are situated in a nonideal world of ignorance, greed, and violence; of poverty,
racism, and sexism. In spite of our ideals, justice under nonideal circumstances,
pragmatic justice, consists in choosing the best alternative now available to us.").
96. The indeterminacy critique contends that law is variable and inconsistent. See Steven
L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CA. L
Rsv. 1441, 1445 (1990) ("[We have an increasing array of indeterminacy and 'law
is politics' arguments that attempt to expose the constructed and contingent nature
of law itself and, thus, to challenge the legitimacy of its current manifestations.").
97. Some critical race scholars use biographical stories to underscore the effects of law's
power on the lives of women and people of color. See, e.g., PATRcA J. WILLIAMS,
THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
98. See Radin, supra note 89. Parity is my own term, not Radin's.
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undisciplined, myopic sense of the word.99 The conceptual tools of
parity and pragmatism together may, however, be useful in interpreting
and cleaning up the appointment process in a way not anticipated by
Carter.
C. Applying Pragmatism and Parity to Appointments
The previous dissections of recent appointment battles serve as a
continuum of evidence that the Article II, Section II process is suffering
from bias, which precludes its most efficient and just administration,
and also prevents its players from effectively fulfilling their leadership
and representational roles. But remedies are hard to come by and
difficult to construct, in part because the prejudice evident in the process
often must be diagnosed and analyzed so carefully. While the prejudice
against lesbians in Achtenberg's case is obvious, the indicia of bias in the
Guinier, Baird, and Wood incidents are not always so evident, because
the bias is so deeply ingrained that it is difficult to name. Yet it is still
necessary to extract the influence of bias from such an important gov-
ernment function. The concepts of pragmatism and parity can help
achieve this end.
As Professor Radin notes, finding solutions to specific problems of
prejudice is a frustrating job when "current social conditions" constitute
Coppressive circumstances."1"' This situation results in the double bind,
an occurrence that Radin illustrates with a variety of specific examples.
For example, she posits that there is no perfect solution to the problem
raised by a society that permits "commodification"-the "buying and
selling of sexual and reproductive activities."'01 On the one hand, allow-
ing women to sell themselves threatens their autonomy and personhood,
because women are then denied their integrity and treated as objects.102
On the other hand, enforced noncommodification poses its own threats,
since we may be denying women one of their rare routes to indepen-
99. See RONALD DwoRmIN, LAw's EMPIRE 95, 151 (1986). Dworkin notes the weakness
of an approach which rejects precedent in favor of "contemporary virtue[s]."
DwoaxIN, supra, at 15. He counsels against the pitfalls of "[aictivism [which] is a
virulent form of legal pragmatism." DWORKIN, supra, at 378, questioned in Farber,
supra note 83, at 1344-48.
100. Radin, supra note 89, at 1700.
101. Radin, supra note 89, at 1699.
102. Radin, supra note 89, at 1699-1700.
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dence. °3 Similar double binds can be seen in a variety of different
contexts, such as special treatment versus equal treatment,'0 4 affirmative
action,105 and rape. 1 6 The double bind illustrates an intractable problem.
Because of the way society is constructed, we need to take certain steps
to protect the weak, but even those protective measures will have their
(perhaps intolerable) cost. The situation that arises in the Article II,
Section II context is a variant of the special treatment/equal treatment
scenario, and the pragmatist can see the concomitant double bind.
How exactly should we advise the Article II, Section II players? If
we emphasize the difference of white women, people of color, and sexual
minorities in the appointment process, then we will face one set of
negative consequences. That is, if we follow the difference model and
propose a rule that consistently requires the President or members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee to be "sensitive," in one form or another,
when a non-majority person is being considered, we could be thwarting
the very goal of parity that we seek to achieve. For example, if we had
officials always consult race, gender, disability, or sexual orientation
experts during the nomination and the hearings, the practice would have
two unpropitious results. First, no President would want to nominate
anyone who is different, since the nomination would carry intimidating
political meaning. Second, we would be setting a precedent which
implies that nominees other than white men are less resilient and
powerful-thus de facto categorically diminishing their authority and
autonomy in the process. Moreover, the uniform application of a
sameness model-the one to which the Senate is probably trying to
adhere in the name of "faimess"-would also not work because it would
leave us with the status quo.
Pragmatism and parity together can provide a flexible tool for
ameliorating bias in the process without evoking the stigma that may
103. See Radin, supra note 89, at 1700.
104. Radin notes that special treatment of pregnant women, for example, may result in
an employer disincentive to hire women, but equal treatment may cost women their
jobs. Radin, supra note 89, at 1701.
105. STEPHEN L. CARTER, REPECrIONS oF AN AFFiRmATv AcTioN BuA (1991); Radin,
supra note 89, at 1702.
106. Radin, supra note 89, at 1702. For example, critics of sexual conduct codes on
college campuses, which are drafted to protect women from sexual assault, emphasize
the danger of codes which " 'expand the definition of rape to include [lack of]
explicit consent. Because the implication is that women are too gullible or too weak,
or too innocent, too fragile to communicate on a very basic level.'" Deborah
Sullivan, Date Rape Allegation Ignites a Furor at Pomona College, LA. TIMm, May
21, 1994, at B1, B2 (quoting author Katie Roiphe) (alteration in original).
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attach to consistent special treatment, and can avoid the pitfalls of
consistent "equal" treatment. This approach acknowledges that each
situation may call for a different method of salvage and repair. For
example, equal treatment was called for in the Bork and Guinier cases;
Guinier should have received a similar opportunity to be heard. On the
other hand, hearings and discourse on harmful sexual misconduct and
the use of pornography were warranted in the case of Clarence Thomas
because his behavior was related to the victimization of Anita Hill, but
discussion about private, consensual sexual activity was not appropriate
or even relevant in the case of Roberta Achtenberg and should have been
met by an educational hearing. In addition, even if President Reagan
was justified in having his aides ask nominee Judge Douglas Ginsburg to
withdraw because his candidacy seemed hypocritical in light of the
President's "war on drugs," 107 Baird and Wood still deserved fair hear-
ings because the basis for their rejections were steeped in preconceptions
about gender roles.
This approach does not have appointment results as its main
concern. Rather, it is focused on the appointment process and its flaws,
and on a panoply of procedural and other devices that may be helpful in
ameliorating the effects of bias."'8 These devices are manifold: beyond
the inquiry methodology that I discuss above, there are procedural
factors that can be used depending on the specific situation, such as
special hearings, burdens of proof and persuasion,'0 9 the decision of
whether to have open sessions, the introduction of expert testimony, and
the decision of whether to introduce rules of evidence, such as relevance.
Uniformly applied procedural rules, such as the ones Carter discusses
107. Judge Ginsburg withdrew his nomination after he admitted that he had smoked mar-
ijuana, since the confession made his appointment seem inconsistent with Reagan's
anti-drug efforts. See Aric Press, Pot and Politis, NEwswEEK, Nov. 16, 1987, at 46.
108. See Farber, supra note 83, at 1342 & n.56 ("Pragmatism has several advantages as an
approach to constitutional law. First, pragmatism responds to our sense that some
constitutional problems are simply hard and unresponsive to any preset formula; it
may take all of our intelligence and creativity to devise an acceptable solution....
Pragmatism also allows judges to use every available intellectual tool to solve consti-
tutional problems.").
109. A special burden of proof was suggested by Senator John Danforth, although many
think wrongfully so, in the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas hearings. He proposed that
the burden be on Hill, in the name of "decency and fairness." See CLaRNCP
THoMAs: CONFRONnNG TaH FUTURE 151 (1992) (citing Senator John Danforth,
Address to the U.S. Senate (Oct. 14, 1991)). Although I think that this would have
been an erroneous allocation of a burden of proof, the idea is an intriguing one and
could be used productively.
[Vol. 3:11
PRAGMATISM AND PARITY IN APPOINTMENTS
and dismisses, will have less efficacy in the appointment process than a
flexible posture that uses all the tools available. Moreover, a grand theory
that always requires equal treatment or special treatment may work
inequitable hardships depending on the circumstances.
A pragmatic approach to appointments has its obvious dangers,
which are in line with Ronald Dworkin's observation that pragmatism
will not work as a basis for judicial review because it can become a
vehicle for undisciplined and opportunistic decisionmaking. 11 For our
purposes, the dangers of pragmatism can be seen in the imiage of the
racist or sexist "pragmatic" Senator, who uses flexibility to help obstruct
the progress of a nonmajority nominee. The virtues of pragmatism and
parity in appointments will not be fully realized until there is greater
diversity, or at least empathy, in the Senate Judiciary Committee and
other influential government bodies that have input in the appointment
process. But Article II, Section II players do realize that voters are
responsive to evidence of bias in appointments.' At least with an eye
toward parity and an acknowledgment that the appointment process can
have cultural-race and gender-meaning,12 a creative, pragmatic
approach can help avoid the double bind that exists in the binary
difference/sameness approach, and can conjure new appointments
models around the issues of politics and social justice that crop up in
each new nomination battle.
Having expanded on Carter's observation of borking through the
use of the twin concepts of pragmatism and parity, I now turn to
Carter's second emphasis, the judicial selection process and its threat to
judicial independence.
II. APPOINTMENTS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Carter is concerned with the "politicization" of the judicial selection
process. Around the time that the Senate rejected Judge Bork because of
his ideology, a group of well-regarded commentators, including Carter,
responded to the Senate's seemingly new practice of asking judicial
nominees ideological questions and basing their confirmation votes on
110. DwoRm, supra note 99, at 95, 151.
111. See Manegold, supra note 66, at A22. See also Gwen Ifill, Female Lawmakers Wrestle
with New Public Attitude on Women' Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at B7;
Primary Factor: Power of Women in Politics, LA. TimES, June 4, 1992, at B6.
112. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection. Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L REv. 317, 323 (1987).
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political considerations." 3 One group of scholars, spearheaded by
Laurence Tribe and his book God Save This Honorable Court, considered
this practice valuable, reasoning that the Senate could responsibly fulfill
its role only by making a "thorough examination of the nominee's basic
outlook and ideas about the law.""' Others, such as Bork, believed that
ideological investigations were questionable policy because they result in
less qualified appointments. 5 In the midst of this flurry of commentary,
Carter published his article The Confirmation Mess,"6 in which he
warned that ideological litmus tests would impair judicial independence.
In his book, Carter expands on his Harvard Law Review article,
detailing the ways he believes that the Senate's ideological investigations
threaten judicial independence. There are various facets to his argument.
First, he contends that a paradox exists in a politicized judicial appoint-
ment, since "[o]n the one hand, the courts exist at least in part to limit
majority sway. On the other, the courts are to be peopled with judges
selected at least in part because their constitutional judgments are
consistent with those of the very majority whose authority they suppos-
edly limit."" 7 The politicized appointment, he finds, is "at least a little
peculiar" because the Senators attempt to provide a "democratic check"
through the scrutiny of judicial philosophy at the hearings, and then
later the expectation arises that the Court should "not be responsive to
political pressure or public protest."" 8
Carter worries that active ideological examinations, especially those
that examine specifics," 9 threaten independence because they may pres-
sure candidates to make promises about future decisions, and they
generally produce the appearance of partiality in nominees since they
will be "known to have made up their minds before they hear arguments
113. Bork's nomination was rejected in 1987. See supra note 1. Laurence Tribe's book,
GOD SAVE Tuis HONORABLE. COURT, supra note 8, was issued in 1985. Bork's book,
THE T MPTINGor AMERucA, supra note 21, was issued in 1990. The Harvard Law
Review, supra note 51, issued a symposium on judicial selection in 1988.
114. ThaiB, supra note 8, at 93. See also Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process:
Law or Polics?, 101 HARv. L. Rav. 1202, 1206 (1988).
115. BoRuc, supra note 21, at 347 ("A president who wants to avoid a battle like mine,
and most presidents would prefer to, is likely to nominate men and women who
have not written much, and certainly nothing that could be regarded as controversial
by left-leaning senators and groups.").
116. Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HAst. L Ra. 1185 (1988).
117. CAtr ER, supra note 26, at 87.
118. COAsera, supra note 26, at 91.
119. CA=Era, supra note 26, at 97-98.
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rather than after."120 In addition, Carter is concerned that the recent
increased emphasis on asking nominees to discuss their ideological
stances is inconsistent with our past respect for nominee reticence, and
may also decrease the quality of judges that we put on the bench. To
illustrate this, he recounts the hearings of Justice Thurgood Marshall,
who refused to delineate his specific views on Miranda v. Arizona,'21 and
posits that such an approach today could earn a nominee a reputation
for evasiveness, hurting his chances for confirmation.
122
Carter raises two other concerns. He contends that the focus on
ideology is a ragged attempt at court packing with current, popular
values in mind, and that this threatens the integrity and consistency of
constitutional principles.123 Moreover, he regards with suspicion an ideo-
logical test that monitors whether a nominee conforms to a more or less
universal moral consensus, such as the desegregation principle set forth
in Brown v. Board of Education.124 He notes, "The fact that it is as easy
to form consensus around an evil principle as around a good one is at
best a reminder of the importance of skepticism of claims that because
a moral consensus exists, the consensus is probably good." 125 He also
wonders if such a consensus is nothing but an illusion-that "consensus"
can only be in the eye of the beholder.
126
120. CAtRaR, supra note 26, at 97.
121. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
122. CARTER, supra note 26, at 62.
123. Carter notes,
Everyone talks about updating the document to reflect our values.... But
changing the set of values that one believes the document should reflect
[only results in] ... us[ing] the judiciary to enforce elite values in the
name of constitutional law. It is easy to see why this approach is ap-
pealing: one can envision seats on the Supreme Court as a costless political
largess, distributed in accordance with the interests of one's political
followers.
CARTER, supra note 26, at 91-92.
124. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Carter believes that most, if not all nominees have adopted the
desegregation principle, and that in this day and age, no segregationist would have
any hope of success in the appointments game. He writes,
Everyone is requited to accept it. Devotees of the original understanding,
to be taken seriously, must argue that the Brown Court rediscovered what
the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment expected-even though most
historians think it plain that the Reconstruction Congress that adopted the
amendment had no intention of authorizing courts to undo segregated
schools.
CARTER, supra note 26, at 121.
125. CArrE, supra note 26, at 123.
126. CARTER, supra note 26, at 123.
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Beyond the procedural suggestions noted above-judicial term
limits, manipulation of timing for testimony, and constitutional alter-
ation of voting thresholds-Carter makes substantive suggestions for
changing dialogue between the judicial nominee and the Senate. He
states that the Senate's responsibility in the hearings is "giv[ing] voice to
the deepest values and aspirations of the American people while at the
same time not compromising the necessary independence of the Justic-
es."' 27 To this end, he suggests eschewing specific questions about case
law and political posture in favor of "get[ting] a sense of the whole
person, an impression partaking not only of the nominee's public legal
arguments but of her entire moral universe." 12' This involves the Senate
ensuring that "[f]irst, the nominee [is] ... a person for whom moral
choices occasion deep and sustained reflection."' 29 Second, the Senate
should ensure that the nominee is "an individual whose personal moral
decisions seem generally sound." 3 '
Carter suggests several areas of inquiry that could provide such a
Window into the nominee's soul. For example, he posits that the Senate
could determine whether the nominee belongs to any club with
exclusionary policies, has violated marital vows, has voted Republican,
has used marijuana, or has had an abortion.' 3 ' He acknowledges that
these lines of questioning threaten the wall between the public and
private domains and may even be politically risky.'32 Nevertheless, he
believes that "[n]one of these queries can be dismissed as entirely irrele-
vant, unless one wants to suppose a theory of human motivation that
rigorously separates the moral premises for actions on the two sides of
the wall," and that the Senate should probably be trusted with drawing
the appropriate lines.133
127. CArrsR, supra note 26, at 150.
128. CARTER, supra note 26, at 151.
129. CaTER, supra note 26, at 152.
130. CARTER, supra note 26, at 152.
131. CxAurna, supra note 26, at 154.
132. CARTR, supra note 26, at 153-54.
133. Carter writes,
Relevance... is not the same as propriety, and the question is who will
decide what lines of relevant inquiry are nevertheless inappropriate.
Perhaps the Senate is too risky a place to lodge the power of decision.
And yet, if members of the Senate who must reach a moral judgment
on the nominee are not to be trusted to draw a line between what may
legitimately be considered and what may not, then it is not easy to see
why they ought to be trusted with any other aspect of the confirmation
decision.
CARTER, supra note 26, at 154.
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It is hard to resolve Professor Carter's worries about Senate hear-
ings' effect on judicial independence. It seems that the Framers settled
the issue of judicial independence when they gave federal judges life
tenure and provided that their salaries could not be diminished.134 In
addition, the practice of considering ideology during the confirmation
process is not new,' 35 and has even received support from Supreme
Court nominees and Justices.'36 Also, ideological questioning does not
really elicit promises of future conduct, but rather seems to be a sporad-
ically effective attempt to get a pulse of the nominee's standpoint. As a
general rule, nominees will either steadfastly refuse to answer any ideo-
logical questions' 37 or articulate their positions on some issues and
134. The Constitution states,
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not
be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
136. See infra note 137 (discussing Frankfurter). See also CARTEa, supra note 26, at 58
("Robert Bork... insists to this day that it was proper to engage in a colloquy
about what was termed his judicial philosophy."); William H. Rehnquist, The
Making of a Supreme Court Justice 29 HAnv. L. Rac. 7 (1959) (asserting that the
Senate should "restore] its practice of thoroughly informing itself on the judicial
philosophy of a Supreme Court nominee before voting to confirm him").
137. This was the case with Justice John Marshall Harlan, see CArrE, supra note 26, at
58, and Justice Felix Frankfurter, who initially refused even to attend the hearings.
At Frankfurter's hearing, he contended that it is "improper for a nominee no less
than a member of the Court to express his personal views on controversial [political]
issues before the Court." HA~Ms, supra note 4, at 310. It should also be remem-
bered, however, that after Frankfurter had spent some time on the bench, he
approved of the rigorous scrutiny that Justice Hughes received after his nomination,
stating,
It is because the Supreme Court wields the power that it wields, that
appointment to the Court is a matter of general public concern and not
merely a question for the profession. In good truth the Supreme Court is
the Constitution. Therefore, the most relevant things about an appointee
are his breadth of vision, his imagination, his capacity for disinterested
judgment, his power to discover and to suppress his prejudices.... In
theory, judges wield the people's power. Through effective exertion of
public opinion, the people should determine to whom that power is
entrusted.
FIax FRANKFURTER, The Appointment of a Justice, in FELIX FRANKURTER ON THE
SUPREME COURT 211, 216-17 (P. Kurland ed., 1970).
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remain reticent on others. 31 Since this reticence has never been pun-
ished by a failure to confirm, a fact which even Carter acknowledges,'39
there seems to be slim danger of binding the future Justice to any
political promises. In any event, even if the Senate were to coax out
some sort of "promise," the future Justice has sufficient autonomy, and
presumably sufficient intelligence, not to apply blindly positions she
discussed at the hearings to any set of facts with which she comes in
contact.
One possible factor indicates that Senate investigations into ideolo-
gy could threaten independence: lower court judges may be influenced
by the hearings. That is, ambitious judges, who aspire to a seat on the
high court, may take their cue from the hearings and shape their juris-
prudence accordingly."' However, if a lower court judge has a propen-
sity to be so influenced, the hearings alone probably do not threaten
independence in this regard. The malleable judge is probably responsive
to the overall political Zeitgeist that helps one type of candidate be
noticed, and not just to particularized ideological issue spotting that she
anticipates will be crucial at possible future hearings.
Finally, the politicization of the appointment process, on the part
of both the Legislative and Executive players, probably can be better
understood as a sort of ebb and flow rather than as the misadventure of
modern Senate appointment politics.141 Some have attributed the ideo-
Other nominees besides Justice Marshall were known as being "evasive," such as
then-Judges Souter and Kennedy. See Donald J. Devine, Reform the Judicial Nomi-
nation Process Now, THE HgrrAGE LEcruRzs, Nov. 12, 1991 ("Thomas was
schooled by a team of Washington insider lobbyists to 'learn' from the Kennedy and
Souter successes to be evasive in his answers to questions.").
138. Such was the case both with Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg. See Remarks by
Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-Ct.) During Floor Debate Regarding Nomination of Clar-
ence Thomas to the Supreme Court, FED. NEWS SERV., Oct. 4, 1991 ("I must say that
I found Judge Thomas' testimony... unsatisfying ... because he appeared almost
casually willing at times to express opinions on some very current and complex issues
of constitutional law ... and reluctant to express any thoughts on others.").
Lieberman concluded that this was a product of the process "as it has evolved since
the Bork nomination," but as is evidenced by the Harlan and Frankfurter hearings,
nominee reticence in hearings has a long history. See also Judge Ginsburg Gives Little
Away at Hearings, NAT. L.J., Aug. 2, 1993, at 5.
139. CAsir, supra note 26, at 59 ("[T]he Senate has never rejected a nominee for failing
to answer its questions.").
140. See Boai, supra note 21, at 347 (It is quite conceivable that some lower court
judges may be affected in the decisions they make and in the opinions they write.").
141. It is difficult to pinpoint the precise reasons some nominations, such as Bork's, have
created a strong backlash and others hqve not, since a whole host of factors may play
into the calculation. For example, the Senate did not react with equal force to Justice
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logical emphasis to the Senate's periodic "muscle-flexings," and Senate
ideological emphasis may also be a balanced response to increased
Presidential attention to politics in appointments.1 3 Carter's theory on
modern judicial selection thus overstates the process's threat to judicial
independence. Therefore, looking for solutions to the politicization
problem will not be the right avenue for reparation.
Carter does pose suggestions for repairing the process; they do not,
however, hold much promise for remedying the politicization of the
Senate hearings. Carter's suggestion that the Senate look to the nomi-
nee's entire "moral universe" is disquietly ambiguous, and such an
inquiry will not preclude the ideological emphases that Carter so wants
to avoid. If we ask the Senate to investigate a nominee's moral vision,
that line of inquiry will inevitably collapse into an ideological investiga-
tion as well, since so much of ideology-for example, one's views on
abortion, defendants' rights, homosexuality and even one's theories on
the role of the Court144 -stems from one's "moral universe." These are
the very types of inquiries that Carter criticizes as threatening judicial
independence.
Scalia's incisive and sometimes razor-edged conservatism, Justice Kennedy's initial
apparent similarities to Bork's ideology, and Thomas's "natural law" theory. Its
relative indifference may depend on several elements. For one, "[tjhe fight over the
Rehnquist nomination [to Chief Justice] deflected attention from Antonin Scalia's
nomination.... Similarly, the struggle over the Bork nomination in 1987 probably
explains why public interest groups took little interest in the nomination of Anthony
Kennedy." Ross, supra note 46, at 23.
142. John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World
Where CourtsAre No Differentfrom Legislatures, 77VA. L Rnv. 833, 875 (1991). Ely
posits that the "Senate may fall into a pattern of 'flexing its muscles' by rejecting two
candidates every few vacancies." Ely, supra, at 875.
143. Thus, the rejection of Bork may be seen as a balanced response to President Reagan's
goal of staffing the judiciary with ideological allies. The Reagan Administration
appeared to try to alter the political and cultural landscape on issues such as abortion
and defendants' rights through judicial nominations. See HERMAN SCHWA-RZ,
PACKING THE COURTS 62 (1988). Its efforts have been cited as reaching beyond past
Administrations' efforts to seat ideologically palatable candidates in its attempt to re-
create a conservative constitutional landscape that "is a return not just to the pre-
Warren Court years but to the era of... Calvin Coolidge." ScHwARITZ, supra, at 43.
144. See, e.g., ARCHIBAL.D Cox, THE CoURTr AND THE CoNsTn ON 327-28 (1987) ("As
conscientious, open-minded judges, we have to reason it out as far as we can, and
then decide intuitively where to strike the balance between the values of repre-
sentative self-government and State autonomy, on the one side, and, on the other
side, the values of national protection for individual human rights."). See also BoiRK,
supra note 21, at 18 ("The Court of each era is likely to choose different provisions
of the Constitution or different formulations of invented rights as the vehicles for its
revisory efforts.... The rhetoric employed will often disclose what values are
popular with the elites to which the Court responds.").
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This flaw is best seen in Carter's observation that a Senator may ask
a nominee whether she has had an abortion to determine her "moral
universe." 145 Whether the nominee has had an abortion may indicate
that she has certain political views about the topic that could influence
her posture on the bench. Moreover, asking a nominee about past drug
use also does not pose a clean morality/ideology dichotomy, because
one's personal feelings about recreational drug use and the "war on
drugs" may inform ideas on defendants' rights.
Carter's comfort level with thorough investigations into morality
also invokes the pragmatism/parity discussion above. Abortion is a well-
known appointment litmus test, which can have different significance
depending on the presiding administration.' Making this type of per-
sonal inquiry opens the door, however, to gender bias in the proceed-
ings, since it would single out women for moral condemnation and
intrude on their reproductive and sexual privacy. To illustrate this point
further, Carter's model would permit active inquiries into Judge Kimba
Wood's past experience with the Playboy Club in the name of deter-
mining her "moral universe," with the public response as the only rein.
Although public response can be an effective tool to stem bias in gov-
ernment, 47 we want a tighter and more immediate mechanism for atten-
uating prejudice in the appointment process.
CONCLUSION
The appointment process is an interpretive device of culture, values,
the Constitution, and their intersection, as much as it is a means of
staffing high-level government positions. 148 Some primary blockages exist
where sexism and racism arise within the process, sullying this interpre-
tive practice with destructive and unproductive prejudice. Still, Carter's
intuition that morality should be investigated is supported by historical
145. CArTER, supra note 26, at 153-54.
146. President Reagan, for example, ruled out several Republican women as judicial nomi-
nees because of their ambiguous views on abortion. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 143,
at 87. On the other hand, President Clinton seemed drawn to nominees who viewed
abortion as a woman's right to choose. See James A. Finefrock, Right Down the
Middle, S.F. ExAM., May 19, 1994, at A20.
147. See supra note 111.
148. This is not a new observation. See HAtRY H. WELLNGTON, INTEWPRETING THE
CONsTTUON: THE SuPREmE COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 152-53
(1990); Bruce Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HLv. L. Rav. 1164
(1988).
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practice: morality, as well as competence and ideology, are factors that
the Executive and the Senate traditionally examine when deciding on
appointments.
The question to which we then return is how to administer this
process while avoiding the pitfalls evident in the Guinier, Baird, Wood,
Achtenberg, and Thomas incidents. The first step is to acknowledge that
morality, competence, and ideology are necessary areas of inquiry; the
second is the concomitant understanding that the procedures and
substantive questions enlisted to uncover the necessary information can
have cultural significance. Thus enter the twin concepts of parity and
pragmatism, which provide an ethos aimed at limiting bias and a mech-
anism for applying that ethos.
Specifically, we can develop a formula that calls for equal treatment
in the Bork and Guinier cases, since we find that ideology is a proper
and relevant area of inquiry, and that parity requires equal opportunities
to be heard. In the Thomas and Achtenberg cases, we see that morality
is an appropriate focus of investigation, but that it operates in very
different and complex ways in both incidents. Thus, a focus on Thom-
as's alleged statements to Hill about his private consumption of pornog-
raphy was necessary and relevant, since it showed whether Thomas
harmed another person, and it told us whether Thomas was fit for a
position which would involve making decisions about sexual harassment.
It was inappropriate, however, to make Achtenberg's sexual orientation
an issue. It was motivated purely by bias toward lesbians and thus was
not purely a morality inquiry; also, her sexual orientation was not
relevant to performing the job for which she was nominated. Different
treatment was also appropriate in the Ginsburg and Baird/Wood cases,
since evidence of illegal drug use may have been inconsistent with
Reagan's drug war, while inquiries into Baird's and Wood's allegedly
illegal childcare practices stemmed in part from traditional assumptions
about women's roles.
This review strives for a recognition of the cultural factors that
operate in appointments and the need for certain types of information
to determine a candidate's fitness for the position in question. There is
no exact science at work, and the evocation of pragmatic theory under-
scores that recognition. Part of the trouble with appointments is that
Article II, Section II is changing with the times, and the clashes we have
seen are symptoms of that change. Politics is a messy business, and the
legal theory that we develop to explain and direct its predominant role
in federal appointments cannot immediately clean up the process. The
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theory and suggestions constructed here, however, may help develop
guideposts for a more productive and enlightened appointment process
in the future. t
